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Abstract 
Less than thirty years after Fukuyama and others declared liberal democracy’s eternal dominance, 
a third wave of autocratization is manifest. Gradual declines of democratic regime attributes 
characterize contemporary autocratization. Yet, we lack the appropriate conceptual and empirical 
tools to diagnose and compare such elusive processes. Addressing that gap, this paper provides 
the first comprehensive empirical overview of all autocratization episodes from 1900 to today 
based on data from the Varieties of Democracy Project (V-Dem). We demonstrate that a third 
wave of autocratization is indeed unfolding. It mainly affects democracies with gradual setbacks 
under a legal façade. While this is a cause for concern, the historical perspective presented in this 
paper shows that panic is not warranted: the current declines are relatively mild and the global 
share of democratic countries remains close to its all-time high. As it was premature to announce 
the “end of history” in 1992, it is premature to proclaim the “end of democracy” now. 
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Introduction 
The decline of democratic regime attributes – autocratization – has emerged as a conspicuous 
global challenge. Democratic setbacks in countries as diverse as Brazil, Burundi, Hungary, Russia, 
Serbia, and Turkey have sparked a new generation of studies on autocratization.1 
  Two key issues are not yet settled in this reinvigorated field. First, scholars agree that 
contemporary democracies tend to erode gradually and under legal disguise (e.g. Bermeo 2016, 
Runciman 2018). Democratic breakdowns used to be rather sudden events – for instance military 
coups – and relatively easy to identify empirically (Linz 1978). Now, multi-party regimes slowly 
become less meaningful in practice (Lührmann et al. 2018) making it is increasingly difficult to 
pin-point the end of democracy. Yet, in face of this emerging consensus we lack the appropriate 
conceptual and empirical tools to systematically analyze such obscure processes. 
The second key issue, partly a product of the first, is that analysts disagree about how 
momentous the current wave of autocratization is. Some draw parallels to the breakdown of 
democracies in the 1930s and the rise of anti-democratic demagogues (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2017, 
Snyder 2017). Others maintain that the world is still more democratic (Mechkova et al. 2017), 
developed (Runciman 2018) and emancipated (Norris 2017) than ever during the 20st century. 
How wide and deep does the current autocratization trend cut? 
 This paper addresses these gaps with a three-pronged strategy. First, it provides a definition 
autocratization as substantial de-facto decline of core institutional requirements for electoral 
democracy. 2  This notion is more encompassing than the frequently used term democratic 
backsliding, which suggests an involuntary reversal back to historical precedents.  
Second, this paper offers a new type of operationalization that in a systematic fashion 
captures the conceptual meaning of autocratization as episodes of meaningful change based on 
data from the Varieties of Democracy Project (V-Dem). This new measure has three major 
advantages: It measures what we actually want to study; it is sensitive to changes in the de-facto 
implementation of democratic rules; and it is nuanced enough to also capture gradual 
autocratization processes and thus avoid biasing the sample towards fast-moving changes.  
                                               
1 See for example Altman and Perez-Liñan 2017, Bermeo 2016, Cassini and Tomini 2018, Coppedge 2017, Diamond 
2015, Haggard and Kaufmann 2016, Levitsky and Ziblatt 2017, Lührmann et al. 2018, Mounk 2018, Runciman 2018, 
Snyder 2017, Wagemann and Tomini 2017 and Waldner and Lust 2018.  
2 Our notion of democracy is based on Dahl’s (1971, 1998) famous conceptualization of electoral democracy as 
‘polyarchy’, namely clean elections, freedom of association, universal suffrage, an elected executive, as well as freedom 
of expression and alternative sources of information. 
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Third, this paper employs the new measure in a systematic study that adds a historical 
perspective on contemporary autocratization. The resultant findings are mixed. On the one hand, 
we are the first to show that a “third wave of autocratization” affecting an unprecedented high 
number of democracies is under way. This wave unfolds slow and piecemeal making it hard to 
evidence. Ruling elites shy away from sudden, drastic moves to autocracy and continue to mimic 
democratic institutions while gradually eroding their functions. This suggests we should heed the 
call of alarm issued by some scholars.  
On the other hand, the evidence here also show that we still live in a democratic era with 
more than half of all countries qualifying as democratic. And, most episodes of contemporary 
autocratization are not only slower, but also much slighter than their historical cousins, as of yet. 
Thus, countries affected remain more democratic than their equivalents hit by earlier waves of 
autocratization.  
Below, we first pursue a review of the literature followed by a reconceptualization of 
autocratization with accompanying operationalization, description of data, and coding procedures. 
The fourth section presents a series of descriptive analyses of the three waves of autocratization, 
followed by a section investigating types of democracy recessions. The final section introduces a 
new metric – the rate of autocratization – as an indicator for the pace of such processes. We 
conclude with a summary of the findings and avenues for future research.  
 
I. State of the Art at Present 
Many have noted that the optimism spurred by the force of the third wave of democratization 
(Huntington 1992) was premature, including Fukuyama’s (1992) relegation of the reverse process 
- autocratization – to the history books. A plethora of autocracies defied the trend (Svolik 2012) 
or made some half-hearted reforms while remaining in the grey zone between democracy and 
autocracy (Schedler 2013; Diamond 2002).  
Yet, when assessments about “freedom in retreat” (Freedom House 2008) or “democratic 
rollback” (Diamond 2008) emerged, they were frequently challenged. At the time, global measures 
of democracy had merely plateaued and established democracies did not exhibit any serious 
problems (Merkel 2010, Levitsky and Way 2015). Now evidence is mounting that a global reversal 
is challenging a series of established democracies, including the United States who was 
downgraded by Freedom House in 2018. Substantial autocratization have been recorded over the 
last ten years in countries as diverse as Hungary, India, Russia, Turkey, and Venezuela (Lührmann 
et al. 2018). An increasingly bleak picture is emerging on the global state of democracy (Diamond 
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2015; Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018; Kurlantzick 2013), even if some maintain that the achievements 
of the third wave of democratization are still visible (Mechkova et al. 2017).   
In view of this, Waldner and Lust (2018: 14) conclude that “[t]he study of [democratic] 
backsliding is an important new research frontier”. A series of new studies on autocratization 
seems to have generated an emerging consensus on one important insight: the process of 
autocratization seems to have changed. Bermeo (2016: 6) for example suggests a decline of the 
“most blatant forms of backsliding” – such as military coups and election day vote fraud. 
Conversely, more clandestine ways of autocratization – harassment of the opposition, subversion 
of horizontal accountability – are on the rise (Bermeo 2016:14; Diamond 2015). Svolik (2015) 
similarly argues that the risk of military coups has declined over time in new democracies, while 
the risk of autogolpes3 remains. Mechkova et al. (2017) showed that in the recent period between 
2006 and 2016 autocratization mainly maimed aspects such as media freedom and the space for 
civil society leaving the institutions of multiparty elections in place. Coppedge (2017) singled out 
the gradual concentration of power in the executive as a key contemporary pattern of 
autocratization – next to what he calls the more “classical” path of intensified repression. 
“Executive aggrandizement” is the term Bermeo (2016: 10) uses for this process. 
While the literature thus agrees that the process of autocratization has changed; it does not 
yet offer a systematic way of measuring the new mode of autocratization. The new contributions 
build on case examples (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018), statistics on selected indicators of gradual 
autocratization – i.e., military coups and electoral fraud (Bermeo 2016), opinion polls (Mounk 
2018) or on changes in quantitative measures over a set time period (Diamond 2015, Lührmann 
et al. 2018). Most existing comparative studies on the causes of autocratization (Svolik 2008, 
Bernhard et al. 2001, Ulfelder and Lustik 2007, Przeworski et al. 2000) as well as descriptive 
overviews (Merkel 2010, Erdmann 2011, Levitsky and Way 2015) are also biased in that they 
include only cases of complete breakdown of democracies. Such binary approaches not only fail 
to capture the often protracted, gradual and opaque processes of contemporary regime change 
(Luedders and Lust 2018), but also exclude important variations: autocratization in democracies 
that do not (yet?) lead to complete breakdown (e.g. Hungary) and reversals in electoral autocracies 
that never became democracies (e.g. Sudan).  
This is important because the archetypical type of dramatic reversals to closed autocracy 
is becoming so rare – as are closed autocracies. While about half of all countries were closed 
                                               
3 Autogolpes are “transitions to authoritarianism caused by the incumbent chief executive” (Przeworski et al. 2000: 
21).   
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autocracies in 1980 but by 2017, they only make up 12 percent of regimes in the world.4 
Contemporary autocrats have mastered the art of subverting electoral standards without breaking 
their democratic façade completely (Schedler 2013; Levitsky and Way 2010). In effect, as of 2017 
a majority of countries still qualify as democracies (56 percent) and the most common form of 
dictatorship (32 percent) are the electoral autocracies (Lührmann et al. 2018: 68). This 
contemporary dominance of multi-party electoral regimes made many analysists posit that 
democracy as a global norm after the end of the Cold War (Norris 2013; Hyde 2011) continues to 
shape expectations and behavior even of autocrats (Diamond 2018).  
In this global context, it does not surprise that sudden reversals to authoritarianism have 
grown out of fashion, because they typically involve the abolishment multi-party elections in a 
coup. Such more visible forms of democratic norm violations carry high legitimacy cost (Schedler 
2013). Obviously “stolen” elections have triggered mass protests leading up to the color 
revolutions (Bunce and Wolchik 2010, Thompson and Kuntz 2009). Likewise, the international 
community often sanctions political leaders who explicitly disrespect electoral results, and 
international aid is often conditioned on a country holding multi-party elections (Kim and Kroeger 
2017). For instance, after the Gambian elections in 2016, president Jammeh’s refusal to accepted 
defeat was quickly met with a military intervention from neighboring countries – forcing him into 
exile.5 The same seem to apply for military coups – which might explain the sharp drop of coups 
in recent decades (Bermeo 2016).  
More difficult to pinpoint as a clear violation of democratic standards, a transition to electoral 
authoritarianism provides fewer opportunities for domestic and international opposition. Electoral 
autocrats secure their competitive advantage through subtler tactic such as censoring and harassing 
the media, restricting civil society and political parties and undermining the autonomy of election 
management bodies. Aspiring autocrats have been shown to learn from each other (Hall and 
Ambrosio 2017) and are borrowing tactics perceived to be less risky than abolishing multi-party 
elections altogether.  
Thus, both prior literature on autocratization as well as the global rise of multiparty elections 
make it plausible that the current wave of autocratization unfolds in a more clandestine and gradual 
fashion than its historical precedents.  
                                               
4  Closed autocracies are typically defined in the literature as regimes where the chief executive is not subjected to de 
jure multiparty elections. Thus, this category includes monarchies, military regimes, as well as one-party states. 
5 See New York Times. 2017. ‘As Gambia’s Yahya Jammeh Entered Exile, Plane Stuffed with Riches Followed.’ 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/23/world/africa/yahya-jammeh-gambia-exile.html (access 30 Mar 2018).  
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This leads to the next question: If autocratization occurs more gradual does this also reduce 
the magnitude of change? Bermeo (2016: 17) suggests it does. Others entertain more pessimism 
in books titled for instance “How democracy dies” (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2017) and “How 
democracy ends” (Runciman 2018). Yet, the recent literature on autocratization does not offer 
fine-grained, systematic empirical comparisons on this issue either.  
Thus, we find important contributions and emerging propositions in the extant literature on 
contemporary autocratization. This paper seeks to fill three main gaps. First, a comprehensive 
conceptualization of autocratization with an accompanying operationalization with high validity is 
clearly needed to make future findings comparable. Second, we lack a comprehensive empirical 
analysis diagnosing contemporary autocratization in historical perspective: (i) its extent and which 
types of regimes are mostly affected compared to previous waves; (ii) the nature of how it is 
enacted by rulers in comparative perspective; and (iii) its pace and magnitude of change. This paper 
seeks to fill these gaps. 
 
II. What Is, and Is Not, Autocratization?  
Pace democratization, there are two seemingly opposed understandings of autocratization, similar 
to the debate about whether democratization should be understood as a difference in kind 
(countries moving across a qualitative threshold; see Przeworski et al., 2000), or in degree (gradual 
moves away from pure dictatorship; see Collier and Adcock 1999, Lindberg 2006, 24-27). We now 
face a similar condo durum with three commonly used terms for varying degrees of differences in 
kind, of moving away from democracy: backsliding, breakdown of democracy, and 
autocratization.6  
We suggest that is preferable to conceptualize autocratization – the antipode of 
democratization – as a matter of degree that can occur both in democracies and autocracies. 
Democracies can lose democratic traits to varying degrees without fully, and long before breaking 
down. For instance, it is still an open question if Orbán’s model of “illiberal democracy” in 
Hungary will transmute into authoritarianism. And non-democratic regimes can be placed on a 
long spectrum ranging from closed autocracies – such as North Korea or Eritrea – to electoral 
autocracies with varying degrees of closeness to democracy - such as Nigeria before the 2015 
                                               
6 While these are the most commonly used terms, it is important to note that others exist as well such as “democratic 
erosion” (Coppedge 2017), “de-democratization” (Tilly 2003), “democratic recession” (Diamond 2015) or “closing 
space” (Carothers and Brechenmacher 2014). For a more extensive list of terms used in the debate see Cassani and 
Tomini (2018: 4).    
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elections. Thus, even most autocracies harbor some democratic regime traits to different degrees 
(e.g. somewhat competitive, but far from fully free and fair elections) and can lose them, such as 
the 1989 military coup in Sudan when Omar Al-Bashir replaced an electoral autocracy with one of 
Africa’s worst closed dictatorships.  
The classic literature (e.g. Linz 1979) focuses on the breakdown of democracies even if some 
also identified gradual erosion of democracy in this earlier period (Przeworski et al. 2000). Sudden 
transitions dominated the moves away from democracy in the 1960s and 1970s making it a proper 
label for moves away from democracy at the time. However, the concept of “breakdown” is useful 
only for a subset of possible episodes of autocratization. First, it requires a crisp approach to the 
difference between democracy and dictatorship to enable the identification of the point of 
breakdown. That excludes studies of the protracted undermining of democratic institutions 
encapsulated by autogolpe and unfinished degeneration of qualities in democracies, as well as the 
waning away of partial democratic qualities in electoral authoritarian regimes. This is particularly 
problematic for the contemporary period when instances of sudden autocratization – coups d’état 
for instance – are rare.  
Some scholars have suggested democratic backsliding to denote the diminishing of democratic 
traits. For example, Bermeo (2016: 5) defines backsliding as “state-led debilitation or elimination 
of any of the political institutions that sustain an existing democracy.” Waldner and Lust (2018: 
5.3) understand backsliding as a “deterioration of entails a deterioration of qualities associated with 
democratic governance, within any regime” (emphasis added). While we are sympathetic to 
Waldner and Lust’s move away from an exclusive focus on democracies, we find the use of term 
backsliding problematic for three reasons: First, democratic backsliding implies a decline “in terms of” 
democracy and thus a conceptual extension beyond the democratic regime spectrum would border 
to conceptual stretching (Sartori 1970). From our point of view, an already autocratic country 
cannot undergo “democratic” backsliding into a deeper dictatorship. Second, the term suggests 
that regimes slide “back” to where they were before whereas in reality they may develop in a new 
direction, to a different form of authoritarianism for example (Runciman 2018: 3). Finally, 
“sliding” makes it sound like an involuntary, unconscious process, which does not do justice to 
conscious actions political actors take in order to change a regime. It simply invokes the wrong 
kind of notion about the process. 
Third, we suggest that the overarching, or superior in Sartori’s terms (1970), concept is 
autocratization. Semantically, it signals that we study the opposite of democratization, thus 
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describing “any move away from [full] democracy” (Lindberg 2009: 12). 7  As an overarching 
concept autocratization covers both sudden breakdowns of democracy á la Linz and gradual 
processes within and outside of democratic regimes where democratic traits decline - resulting in 
less democratic, or more autocratic, situations (Figure 1). This conceptualization enables us to 
study both the pace and the methods of bringing a regime closer to a closed dictatorship, while 
keeping the distinction between democratic recessions starting in democracies, democratic 
breakdowns, and further consolidation of already authoritarian regimes. 
To provide comprehensive definition of autocratization processes, we use the term 
democratic recession to denote autocratization processes taking place in democracies, democratic 
breakdown to capture when a democracy turns into an autocracy, and autocratic consolidation as 
designation for gradual declines of democratic traits in already authoritarian situations.  
 
Figure 1. Autocratization as Democratization in Reverse 
 
 
III. Operationalization and Data 
Contemporary political science puts a heavy emphasis on identification of causal factors, and some 
distrust any analysis based on observational data. However, we cannot randomly assign either 
autocratization nor its potential causes to countries. Whether we like it or not, we must rely on 
observational data to depict, understand, and explain the current (worrying) trend of 
autocratization. Taking one step back, any causal analysis is predicated on an accurate description 
of the outcome: how do we know a autocratization process when we see it? What are the more 
useful ways to decipher the dynamics and depict patterns, so as to facilitate descriptive inferences?  
                                               
7 Cassani and Tomini (2018) define autocratization positively as a “process of regime change towards autocracy that 
makes politics increasingly exclusive and monopolistic, and political power increasingly repressive and arbitrary.” This 
definition differs from our approach to think about autocratization negatively - as a move away from democracy. We 
prefer our approach for two reasons. First, it is in-line with the common understanding of autocracy as non-democracy 
(e.g. Schedler 2013). Second, our approach allows us to understand autocratization and democratization as mutually 
exclusive, which allows us to operationalize them unambiguously.  
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While there is relatively satisfactory data on sudden breakdowns – for instance on military 
coups (Powell and Thyne 2011) and dichotomous measures focusing on transitions from 
democracy to autocracy recorded in extant datasets (e.g. Bernhard et al. 2001; Haggard and 
Kaufmann 2016), we have lacked sufficiently nuanced yet systematic cross-national, times-series 
data on various aspects of regimes to detail incremental autocratization processes.  
This paper presents a novel approach identifying autocratization episodes – connected periods 
of time with a substantial decline in democratic regime traits. We use V-Dem’s data (Coppedge et 
al. 2017a, v7.1) on 178 countries from 1900 to the end of 2016, or 17,604 country-years.8 To 
identify autocratization episodes, we rely on the Electoral Democracy Index (EDI, v2x_polyarchy). 
The EDI captures to what extend regimes achieve the core institutional requirements in Dahl’s 
(1971, 1998) famous conceptualization of electoral democracy as ‘polyarchy’ (Teorell et al. 2018). 
For present purposes, V-Dem’s EDI has four key advantages. First, V-Dem data provides vast 
temporal and geographical coverage with data reaching back to 1900. Second, the EDI reflects 
how democratic a political regime is de-facto beyond the mere de-jure presence of political 
institutions. And, it has a strong theoretical foundation in regime attributes that Dahl has identified 
as core requirements for an electoral democracy.9 Finally, as a continuous index of de-facto levels 
of democracy it is sensitive to gradual and slow-moving autocratization processes. 
The EDI runs on a continuous scale from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating a more 
democratic dispensation. We operationalize autocratization as a substantial decline on the EDI 
(within one year or over a connected time period). A decline is substantial if it amounts to drop of 
0.1 or more on the EDI. The choice of cut-off point on a continuous index is naturally arbitrary 
but a change of 10% seems a reasonable and intuitive choice for the following reasons. This 
relatively demanding cut-off point of 0.1 minimizes the risk of measurement error driving the 
results since it requires more of an agreement among V-Dem coders that declines occurred among 
the 40 components of the EDI to achieve this magnitude of difference on the EDI scale.10  The 
                                               
8 Approximately half of the indicators in the V-Dem dataset are based on factual information from official documents 
such as constitutions. The remainder consists of expert assessments on topics like the quality of elections and de facto 
compliance with constitutional standards. On such issues, typically five experts provide ratings for the country, 
thematic area and time period for which they are specialists (Coppedge et al 2017b). 
9 Lührmann et al. (2018) use V-Dem’s Liberal Democracy Index to identify democratic declines. The advantage of 
this alternative strategy is that it provides an early warning tool because liberal aspects of democracy often are the first 
to erode (see Coppedge 2017). However, the aim of this paper is different. Namely, we want to provide a heuristic 
device, which facilitates the analysis of questions such as how liberal constraints influence the likelihood of 
autocratization. Therefore, we need to operationalize autocratization in a way that is parsimonious and does not 
include liberal aspects of democracy.  
10 V-Dem aggregates the expert assessments using Bayesian IRT model (Pemstein et al. 2017, Marquardt and Pemstein 
2017). This model also provides an estimate of uncertainty reflecting mainly how much experts disagree. Almost all 
of the declines of 0.1 or more are visible even after considering this uncertainty estimate. The only exception are two 
episodes in Finland (1939-1940) and Niger (2013-2016), where the V-Dem data indicated a low level of certainty about 
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cut-off point should also be high enough to rule out inconsequential changes but low enough to 
capture substantial yet incremental changes that do not amount to a full breakdown. A typical 
example would be the series of declines in democratic qualities in Hungary from 2006 to 2016 
adding up to drop of the EDI of 0.11. In appendix A4, we demonstrate the robustness of the main 
findings of this paper to a higher cut-off point. 
Episodes of autocratization have a start and an end. We proceed in two steps to identify 
such episodes. First, we identify potential autocratization episodes, which are adverse regime 
change of any magnitude. Second, we exclude all minor episodes with an overall change of less 
than 10% of the EDI. 
To identify all potential episodes, we devise a set of coding rules for start, continuation, 
and end points. A potential autocratization episode starts with a decline on the EDI of 0.01 points 
or more, from one year to the next. We chose this relatively low threshold in order to catch the 
very beginning of incremental autocratization episodes.11 Second, the potential episode continues 
as long as there is a continued decline. We allow a potential episode to contain up to three years 
of stagnation (no further decline of 0.01 points on the EDI) in order to reflect the concept of 
slow-moving processes that can move in fits and starts with a careful autocrat at the helm. The 
potential autocratization period ends when there are no further declines on the EDI of 0.01 or 
more over four years, or if the EDI increases by 0.02 points or more during one of those years 
since the latter would indicate a potential democratization episode.12  
 Finally, we calculate the total magnitude of change from the year before the start of an 
episode to the end, and we only include as manifest autocratization episodes those which add up 
to a change of at least 0.1 on the EDI scale.13 These coding rules ensure that periods of some fits 
and starts in what is often a protracted and messy process, are counted as one episode while at the 
same time minimizing the risk that measurement error plays a role in determining when an episode 
starts or finishes. Yet, Appendix A4 demonstrates that the main findings of this paper are robust 
to modifications of the coding rules.  
To illustrate the validity of the coding rules, consider ongoing autocratization in Turkey. 
Our coding rules date the beginning of the shrinking of democratic space in Turkey to 2005 with 
                                               
the declines. However, we cross-checked both cases with qualitative references and are confident that the changes 
should be considered as autocratization episodes. 
11 Robustness checks with different thresholds yield similar results in regression analysis (see Appendix A4).  
12 A lower threshold of 0.01 for ending episodes would for instance lead to the contemporary episode in Russia to be 
limited to the years 2000-2011, even though already the prior years and the years after 2011 saw major cumulative 
declines (-.026 between 1994 and 1999 and -0.528 from 2011-2016). Our current rules capture this protracted process 
as spanning from 1994-2016.    
13 An alternative option would have been to use a rolling five-year average change on the EDI as for instance 
Coppedge (2017) has done. However, our strategy gives us a precise start or end point of more creeping processes.  
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a small decline of -0.019 in the V-Dem EDI; additional gradual declines in subsequent years and 
steep annual declines from 2013 onwards (see Figure D1 in the Appendix).14  Changing the 
threshold for the start of autocratization episodes to -0.02 would have moved the starting year to 
2011. The qualitative case literature evidence that the gradual autocratization in Turkey started in 
2005, or even earlier. Essen and Gumuscu (2016: 1590) claim that the Freedom and Justice Party 
(AKP) started to use autocratic tactics such as intimating journalists immediately after its ascend 
to power in 2002. Others suggest that the Turkish government mainly pursued a democratic 
reform agenda in order to gain EU membership between 2002 to 2005 (Kubiek 2011). In 2005, 
this emphasis gradually started to change when the EU turned its focus from verbal commitments 
to the actual implementation of political reforms (Kubiek 2011: 918ff). Democratic reforms stalled 
and political rights violations intensified, such as the police brutality against a peaceful march on 
International Women’s Day and the controversial trail against the writer Orhan Pamuk.15 The 
decline of democratic traits reflected in critical EU reports in 2008 and 2009 (Kubiek 2011: 919). 
For many observers, the crack-down against civil society groups, media peaceful protesters in 
relationship to Istanbul’s Gezi Park protests in 2013 was a clear indication that Turkey is on the 
pathway to autocracy (Essen and Gumuscu 2016; Bashirow and Lancaster 2018). Admittedly, it is 
difficult to precisely pin-point when autocratization started due to the gradual nature and opacity 
of the processes. However, much points to 2005 as the year when the negative developments 
started to supersede democratic process, lending support to our operationalization strategy based 
on V-Dem data.  
For some analyses, one obviously needs a clear-cut distinction between democracies and 
autocracies. Following Lührmann et al. (2018), we define countries as democracies if they hold free 
and fair and de-facto multiparty elections, and achieve at least a minimal level of institutional 
guarantees captured by the EDI, with a theoretically driven operationalization.  
 
IV. Diagnosing Autocratization from 1900 to 2016   
Here we present the first ever comprehensive identification of the 202 autocratization episodes 
taking place in 108 countries from 1900 to 2016 (Table A1 in the Appendix) leaving only 67 states 
unaffected (Table A2 in the Appendix).16 Seven countries experienced autocratization solely due 
                                               
14 Between 2004 and 2012 the EDI drops from 0.69 to 0.57 (-0.11 over eight years) and in 2016 it reaches the low-
point of 0.34 (-0.16 over four years since 2012).  
15 See Kubiek (2011: 918ff) and Human Rights Watch. 2006. https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2006/country-
chapters/turkey.   
16 This count includes only countries still in existence in 2016.  
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to foreign invasion during the two World Wars.17 Thus, 74 countries never autocratized in their 
history without being subjugated by a foreign power but this count includes 27 countries classified 
as autocracies in 2016 such as North Korea and Angola who seem to be caught in an “autocracy 
trap” and due to the “floor effect” never had much possibility to become worse. The remaining 
47 “non-autocratizers” are classified as democracies in 2016. This group consists mainly of 
countries with a long democratic history, such as Sweden and Switzerland, or that democratized 
recently, such as Bhutan and Namibia.  
Roughly two-thirds the autocratization episodes (N=140, 69 percent) took place in already 
authoritarian states. Noteworthy are the many (57) episodes of autocratization in Africa, most of 
which occurred in electoral autocracies where autocratization dissipated initial democratic gains. 
For instance, three autocratization episodes in Sudan (1958-1959; 1969; 1989-1990) followed 
military coups disposing presidents elected in less-than perfect elections.  
About a third of all autocratization episodes (N=62) episodes started under a democratic 
dispensation. Almost all of the latter (N=53, 85 percent) led to the country turning into an 
autocracy. Only nine of the autocratization episodes affecting democracies have been deflected to 
preserve democracy. Yet, three of these nine episodes were ongoing in 2016 and the eventual 
outcome is unknown: Moldova, Poland, and Brazil. This should give us great pause about specter 
of the current third wave of autocratization. Very few episodes of autocratization starting in 
democracies have ever been stopped before countries become autocracies. 
 
The third wave of autocratization is real and endangers more democracies.  
Huntington famous identification of three democratization waves was accompanied by two 
reverse waves, the first from 1922 to 1942 and a second from 1960 to 1975 decimating the number 
of democracies (Huntington 1992). Our new measure of autocratization episodes picks up these 
two reverse waves and clearly shows that a third wave of autocratization is now manifest (Figure 
2).18 The thick black line represents the share of countries that were affected by autocratization 
each year. The green and blue-dashed lines indicate how many of these were democracies and 
autocracies, respectively when the episode began. There were 40 autocratization episodes starting 
                                               
17 Albania, Romania, Belgium, Denmark, France, Netherlands and Norway.  
18 Some scholars (see Doorenspleet 2000) posit that the three -wave metaphor is an artefact of newly independent 
countries appearing in the sample. In the V-Dem data colonies are include as separate observations, thus such 
concerns apply to a lesser extent than for other datasets. Nevertheless, following Doorenspleet’s suggestions we show 
that the three reverse waves are also manifest when basing the graphical analysis on the total number of observations 
and not on the share of countries (Figure AC.2; Appendix AC). Others distinguish between a third and fourth wave 
of democratization (Mc Faul 2002). However, the more common approach is the distinction in three waves of 
democratization, which we adhere to here.   
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before the end of World War II in the first wave; 99 episodes during the second reversed wave 
between 1946 and 1990 at the end of the Cold War; and the remaining 64 episodes started in the 
third wave. A breakdown of these episodes by region is found in Appendix B. 
 
Figure 2. The Three Waves of Autocratization   
 
 
One observation immediately stands out from Figure 2. Whereas the first reversed wave affected 
both democracies and autocracies, and the second reversal period almost only autocracies, the 
current period is characterized by democratic recession: Almost all autocratization episodes affect 
democracies. This is the first time that systematic difference has been shown, and it presents a 
source of concern especially given the finding reported above that few such episodes stop short 
of decent into authoritarianism. 
The present third wave of reversal may still be picking up. It is affecting 15 countries in 
2016. Overall, post-communist Eastern European countries account for 16 mainly protracted, 
autocratization episodes in the third wave, showing a similarity to the second wave where gains in 
newly independent countries fading away – exemplified by the gradual autocratization processes 
in Russia, Hungary, and Poland.  
Yet, another way of diagnosing the current trend is to look at the share of countries that 
are democracies, and how large a share of these that are affected by autocratization. That is what 
is presented in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4. Global Share of Democracies and Democracies Affected by Autocratization, 1900-2016 
 
The share of democracies going through democratic recession has increased steadily since 
the Mid 1990s with a peak in 2012 but still affects not even 5 percent of democracies at present. 
This shows that the trend is, for now at least, less dramatic than some claim. The share of countries 
in the world that are democratic is also close to its highest ever. To some extent, the latter explains 
the former. The more democratic countries there are, the greater the likelihood that democracies 
suffer setbacks.  
In sum, an important structural characteristic of the third wave of autocratization is 
unprecedented: It mainly affects democracies – and not electoral autocracies as the early waves - 
and this occurs while the global level of democracy is close to an all-time high with about 56 
percent of the states in the world are democracies.   
 
The third wave of democratic recession has a legal facade.  
Arguably, the loss of democratic traits in regimes that were democratic before the start of the 
autocratization episode matters more for the state of democracy in the world than further 
deterioration in already autocratic regimes. In this and the next section, we analyze these 62 
episodes of democratic recessions in more depth.   
 16 
The literature suggests that incumbents behind the current processes of autocratization are 
using mostly legal means and that illegal power grabs have become less frequent. We test this 
proposition by distinguishing between four different types of autocratization strategies based on 
how explicitly they alter the power of the chief executive.19 The results are reported in Figure 5. 
The analysis uses original data covering all autocratization episodes affecting democracies from 
1900 to 2016, clustering around the three reversal waves.20  
 
Figure 5. Access to and Extension of Chief Executive Power during Democratic Recessions 
 
Note: 17 episodes are included in the first wave; 12 in the second wave and 33 in the third wave. 
 
The first wave of reversals is almost completely dominated by the “classic” from of 
autocratization tactics of illegal access to power (53 percent of episodes), such as a military coup or 
foreign invasion, and by a major extension of the chief executive’s power (41 percent). The latter includes 
“autogolpes” where the incumbent suddenly expands his power as for instance President Terra 
                                               
19 The four mutually exhaustive and exclusive categories are: 0 “Illegal access to power”; 1 “Legal access to power and 
a major extension of the Chief Executive’s power beyond the temporal or substantial scope previously envisioned in 
the legal framework such as the establishment of a new constitution, the application or threat of force”; 2  “Legal 
access to power, and a minor formal extension of the Chief Executive’s power beyond the temporal or substantial 
scope previously envisioned in the legal framework, i.e. constitutional changes (such as extension of term limits or 
presidential powers) sanctioned by the constitutional court, the parliament or in a referendum; or a temporary 
application of emergency law at national level”; 3 “Legal access to power and no formal extension of the Chief 
Executive’s power beyond the temporal or substantial scope previously envisioned in the legal framework”. 
20 The coding process proceeded in three steps: First, we used V-Dem data to identify whether or not the appointment 
of the Head of the Executive involved force (v2expathhs/v2expathhg; Coppedge et al. 2017b). Second, taking into 
account this information, a research assistant coded the four sub-categories based on standard references such as 
Nohlen (2010) and Lentz (1999) as well as case specific literature. Third, we verified the coding choices in particular 
with regards to borderline cases. Table A1 in the appendix shows the categorization of individual episodes. Detailed 
case narratives including sources are available on request.        
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did in Uruguay in 1933. Even Hitler came to power using legal means and then drastically expanded 
his power with the “Ermächtigungsgesetz” (Enabling Act) in 1933.  
In the second wave of autocratization the illegal access peaked with the many military coups 
in Latin America and Europe, and this tactic accounted for two-thirds of all autocratization 
episodes in this wave of reversals. Incumbent changing the accustomed legal order only in minor 
ways – for instance through extending their term limits was used only twice in the first and second 
waves. A completely new tactic also emerges in this second wave: Legal access to power without making 
any major, formal changes to the office of the chief executive, but still infringing on democratic norms 
and practices to pull the regime towards autocracy. It only happened once in the second reversal 
wave (Dominican Republic; 1987-1990) but was then a significant precursor to what was to come. 
The current period of autocratization is unique in that the new modal tactic is legal access 
and no formal change of how much power the chief executive has or how long he is allowed to stay 
in office. This type accounts for 41 percent in the third reversal wave with prominent cases of 
such gradual deterioration in Hungary and Poland. Furthermore, several incumbents changed the 
formal scope of their office only in minor ways (used in six episodes so far during the ongoing wave 
of autocratization, for example in Russia and Turkey). Such incremental tactics are harder to detect, 
and now together account for a majority, or 63 percent, of the episodes compared to only 17 
percent in the second and 6 percent in the first reversal waves. Aspiring autocrats have clearly 
found a new set of tools to stay in power, and that news has spread. 
 
The third wave of democratic recessions is gradual  
In terms of pace, we can, again for the first time, show that 75 percent of all autocratization 
episodes across the entire time period were relatively short, taking five years or less. Only 10 
percent are highly protracted with a duration of eight years or more, with the record of 23 years in 
Russia from 1994 to 2016.  
We have developed another new metric to measure the rate of autocratization in a more 
informative way than just the number of years: maximum annual depletion rate. This metric captures 
how fast democratic traits decline during an autocratization episode in terms of changes from one 
year to the other on the V-Dem EDI. Using the maximum allows us to distinguish between 
episodes where a period of gradual declines combines with a sudden decline in democratic traits, 
and stretches that consist of gradual declines only. The advantage of maximum depletion rate is 
that a high value indicates that the episode encompassed a sudden and radical change where as a 
low value indicates an autocratization process that was incremental throughout. For ease of 
interpretation, we report maximum depletion rate values as a percentage of 1 (the highest possible 
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score on EDI). Thus, if the maximum change in the EDI from one year to the next during an 
autocratization episode was -0.1, the corresponding autocratization rate is 10 percent.  
For instance, the autocratization episode in Germany from 1923 to 1935 started with ten 
years of gradual declines during the Weimar Republic - amounting to a 7% change on the EDI. 
Yet, the main characteristic of this episode was Hitler’s accession to power in 1933 and subsequent 
sudden breakdown of the democratic system in 1934. This is reflected by a high maximum 
depletion rate of 27%. Conversely, chapters such as Turkey from 2005 to 2016 and Russia from 
1994 to 2016, involve only gradual changes – reflected by relatively low depletion rates of 7% 
(Turkey) and 9% (Russia). Alternative measures of pace such as the average depletion rate, the 
annual depletion rate and the decay rate, do not fully capture the difference between these two 
patterns. However, we include those as robustness tests to the subsequent empirical analysis (see 
detailed discussion in Appendix C and E). 
Figure D.2 in Appendix D shows a box plot comparing democratic recessions during the 
three reversal waves using this new metric. The median autocratization rate was at 30 percent 
during the first two waves and dropped to 10 percent in the third wave.21 At the bottom end of 
the scale with a 3.4 percent maximum depletion rate we find with the extremely gradual 
autocratization process in Sri Lanka from 1977 to 1983, followed by Hungary’s spell from 2006 to 
2016 at 3.7 percent. The most sudden breakdowns occurred after the German invasion during 
World War II in the Netherlands (47 percent) and the Czech Republic (46 percent).  
                                               
21 It is important to note that the decline of the autocratization rate is not just a mere function of the shift to quasi-
legal forms of autocratization reported in the prior section: Autocratization has become more gradual across all types 
of autocratization - even if the autocratizer comes to power illegally or majorly extents his power (see Figure D3 in 
Appendix D).  
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Figure 6. Global Trend Autocratization Rate during Democratic Recessions and Share of Democracies 
 
Note: The autocratization rate captures how fast the V-Dem Electoral Democracy Index declines at the peak of the autocratization 
episode in terms of changes from one year to the other. High values indicate sudden autocratization and low values more gradual. 
The x-axis of the figure shows the year where the peak of the autocratization rate occurred during the episode.  
 
Over time the rate of autocratization in democracies has dropped significantly (r=-0.67; 
red, dashed line on Figure 6) over time.  At the same time, the global share of democracies 
increased remarkably – to hover around 56 percent after the turn of the century (black line). The 
global share of democracies is negatively correlated with the autocratization rate at a statistically 
significant level. This relationship holds even when controlling for important confounders such as 
GDP, time since transition, level of democracy and foreign occupation as well as the types of 
democratic recession reported in the prior section. Based on these regression analyses (results 
omitted here, see Appendix C), the rate of autocratization among democracies is estimated to drop 
from 32 percent when few countries were democratic (15 percent; e.g. in the early 1930s) to 14 
percent at the peak of the third wave when half of the world’s countries were democratic. This 
finding is robust to alternative specifications of the autocratization rate (Appendix C) as well as of 
the autocratization episodes (Appendix E).  
However, since we have to rely on observational data and a relatively small number of 
cases (62), we need to acknowledge these empirical tests as tentative findings. Nevertheless – as 
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discussed in the literature review - there are reasonable intuitions for why a global rise of 
democracy should be expected to have a dampening effect on the rate of autocratization.  
This development results opposite expectations for the further prospects of democracy. On 
the one hand, autocratization has become more obscure and therefore one can suspect less likely 
to produce triggers for mobilization of pro-democratic forces. On the other hand, autocratization 
has also become less severe – at least on average. Figure 7 illustrates how the effect of 
autocratization on the level of democracy in affected countries has changed over time. The y-axis 
shows the total EDI drop during an autocratization episode and the x-axis the EDI score at the 
final year of autocratization. Before 1990, autocratization typically resulted in the dramatic 
transitions to closed autocracy with a median EDI score of 0.15 at the end of the episode. During 
the third wave of autocratization, the median democracy level remains much higher with a score 
of 0.43 on the EDI. Also, the median total decline of democratic attributes during the third wave 
(-0.20) is less than half of the decline during the first (-0.49) and second wave (-0.44).  
 
Figure 7. The Consequences of Autocratization on the Level of Democracy 
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Conclusion: The Third Wave of Autocratization   
This paper presents the first systematic empirical analysis of contemporary autocratization in 
historical perspective. The paper, first, contributes with a new method to identify not only sudden 
but also gradual autocratization episodes, providing a comprehensive empirical overview of 
adverse regime change from 1900 to today across the democracy-autocracy spectrum.  
Second, we provide evidence that contemporary declines of democracy amount to a third 
wave of autocratization. A key finding is that the present reverse wave – starting after 1990 - mainly 
affects democracies, unlike prior waves. What is especially worrying about this trend is that 
historically, very few autocratization episodes starting in democracies has been stopped short of 
turning countries into autocracies. 
Furthermore, we present a series of descriptive tests corroborating key claims found in the 
extent literature but not tested before on systematic evidence: Contemporary autocratizers mainly 
use legal and gradual strategies to undermine democracies. Based on original data, we show that 
about 72 percent of all contemporary democratic recessions – autocratization episodes starting in 
democracies – are led by incumbents who came to power legally and typically by democratic 
elections. Conversely, during the first and second reverse wave most democratic recessions 
included an illegal power grab, such as a military coup. Whereas autocratizers during the first and 
second wave took clearly recognizable moves such as issuing a new non-democratic constitution 
or dissolved the legislature, 40 percent of contemporary autocratizers do not change the formal 
rules. Thus, also the way incumbents undermine democracy has become more informal and 
clandestine. 
 Finally, we devise a new metric – the autocratization rate – capturing how fast regimes lose 
their democratic quality from one year to the other measured as a percentage change of the highest 
possible value of V-Dem’s EDI. We can then show that autocratization has become much more 
gradual than before. Its maximum rate declined from a median of about 30 percent in the first 
wave to about 10 percent in the third wave. This trend is strongly correlated with the changes in 
the global share of democratic regimes. As democracy spread around the global in the 1990s and 
2000s, autocratization became more gradual. While this trend stands up to regression analysis with 
the inclusion of confounders, we are careful not to draw too strong inferences from that empirical 
test, since we are relying on observational data and a relatively small number of cases.  
By now, most regimes – even autocracies -  hold some form of multiparty elections. Sudden 
and illegal moves to autocracy tend to provoke national and international opposition. The tests we 
present suggest that contemporary autocratizers have learned their lesson and thus now proceed 
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in a much slower and much less noticeable way than their historical predecessors. Thus, while 
democracy has undoubtedly come under threat, its normative power still seems to force aspiring 
autocrats to play a game of deception.  
Consequently, states hit by the third wave of autocratization remain much more democratic 
than their historical cousins. On the one hand, this gives hope that the current wave of 
autocratization might be milder than the first and second waves. On the other hand, the third wave 
may still be picking up. It has affected 15 countries in 2016 and more are on the threshold. For 
these countries, two scenarios are plausible: Because autocratization is more gradual, democratic 
actors may remain strong enough to mobilize resistance. This happened for instance in South 
Korea in 2017, when mass protests forced parliament to impeach the president, which stopped 
the ongoing autocratization episode (Shin and Moon 2017: 130). Conversely, initial small steps 
towards autocracy brought other countries – such as Turkey, Nicaragua, Venezuela and Russia – 
on a slippery slope deep into the authoritarian regime spectrum. Future research needs to 
investigate what distinguishes these two scenarios and how autocratization can be stopped and 
reversed. Yet, one conclusion is clear: As it was premature to announce the “end of history” in 
1992, it is premature to proclaim the “end of democracy” now.  
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APPENDIX A: Autocratization Episodes 
Table A.1 Autocratization Episodes Starting in Democracies  
 
Country Begin End EDI  
before 
ED
I 
end 
Rate Access to and Extension of Chief 
Executive Power  
FIRST WAVE 
Argentina 1930 1931 0.52 0.17 28.89 Legal Access/Major Extension 
Austria 1930 1935 0.73 0.10 33.33 Legal Access/Major Extension 
Belgium 1914 1915 0.58 0.18 26.73 Illegal Access to Power 
Belgium 1940 1941 0.59 0.13 32.28 Illegal Access to Power 
Czech Republic 1930 1940 0.81 0.07 46.28 Illegal Access to Power 
Denmark 1940 1944 0.85 0.21 31.14 Illegal Access to Power 
Estonia 1929 1936 0.75 0.20 25.18 Legal Access/Major Extension 
Finland 1939 1940 0.64 0.54 8.77 Legal Access/Minor Extension 
France 1939 1941 0.56 0.09 30.00 Legal Access/Major Extension 
Germany 1923 1934 0.65 0.08 26.92 Legal Access/Major Extension 
Latvia 1934 1935 0.77 0.14 45.30 Legal Access/Major Extension 
Lithuania 1924 1927 0.61 0.15 39.99 Illegal Access to Power 
Netherlands 1940 1941 0.76 0.17 46.60 Illegal Access to Power 
Norway 1940 1942 0.75 0.12 37.84 Illegal Access to Power 
Poland 1926 1931 0.66 0.23 32.00 Illegal Access to Power 
Spain 1936 1940 0.56 0.07 17.11 Illegal Access to Power 
Uruguay 1933 1934 0.58 0.30 19.24 Legal Access/Major Extension 
SECOND WAVE 
Argentina 1966 1967 0.53 0.11 25.28 Illegal Access to Power 
Argentina 1975 1977 0.59 0.07 30.65 Illegal Access to Power 
Chile 1973 1974 0.71 0.07 33.98 Illegal Access to Power 
Dom. Rep. 1987 1990 0.57 0.45 10.78 Legal Access/No Formal Extension 
Fiji 1987 1988 0.59 0.22 28.16 Illegal Access to Power 
Ghana 1981 1982 0.57 0.12 34.94 Illegal Access to Power 
India 1971 1976 0.69 0.42 15.83 Legal Access/Minor Extension 
Peru 1990 1995 0.68 0.26 29.90 Legal Access/Major Extension 
Sri Lanka 1977 1983 0.63 0.51 3.42 Legal Access/Major Extension 
Suriname 1980 1981 0.76 0.17 43.62 Illegal Access to Power 
Turkey 1980 1981 0.63 0.12 34.83 Illegal Access to Power 
Uruguay 1963 1976 0.81 0.10 23.15 Illegal Access to Power 
 
THIRD WAVE 
Armenia 1994 1997 0.65 0.42 14.27 Legal Access/Minor Extension 
Belarus 1995 2001 0.63 0.25 9.31 Legal Access/Minor Extension 
Bolivia 2006 2014 0.77 0.62 4.13 Legal Access/Major Extension 
Brazil 2012 2016 0.89 0.73 12.88 Legal Access/No Formal Extension 
Ecuador 2008 2009 0.74 0.59 9.86 Legal Access/Major Extension 
Fiji 2006 2009 0.59 0.14 31.21 Illegal Access to Power 
Honduras 2005 2010 0.61 0.46 11.98 Illegal Access to Power 
Hungary 2006 2015 0.81 0.69 3.73 Legal Access/No Formal Extension 
Macedonia 2005 2013 0.66 0.45 6.04 Legal Access/No Formal Extension 
Madagascar 1996 2001 0.59 0.46 7.60 Legal Access/No Formal Extension 
Maldives 2012 2016 0.59 0.39 8.76 Legal Access/No Formal Extension 
Mali 2012 2013 0.67 0.46 15.84 Illegal Access to Power 
Moldova 2001 2005 0.61 0.48 6.90 Legal Access/No Formal Extension 
Moldova 2012 2016 0.71 0.57 6.19 Legal Access/No Formal Extension 
Nepal 2012 2013 0.53 0.33 18.63 Illegal Access to Power 
Nicaragua 2003 2016 0.66 0.36 7.96 Legal Access/Minor Extension 
Country Begin End EDI  
before 
ED
I 
end 
Rate Access to and Extension of Chief 
Executive Power  
Niger 1996 1997 0.57 0.42 12.93 Illegal Access to Power 
Niger 2005 2010 0.62 0.29 21.57 Illegal Access to Power 
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Niger 2013 2016 0.67 0.55 10.02 Legal Access/No Formal Extension 
Palestine 2005 2008 0.59 0.24 16.65 Legal Access/Major Extension 
Philippines 1999 2007 0.63 0.49 5.66 Illegal Access to Power 
Poland 2013 2016 0.89 0.68 16.23 Legal Access/No Formal Extension 
Russia 1994 2016 0.57 0.28 8.60 Legal Access/Minor Extension 
Serbia 2009 2016 0.67 0.47 6.71 Legal Access/No Formal Extension 
South Korea 2007 2014 0.84 0.73 3.30 Legal Access/No Formal Extension 
Sri Lanka 2004 2008 0.57 0.43 6.87 Legal Access/No Formal Extension 
Thailand 2003 2006 0.56 0.28 25.29 Illegal Access to Power 
Thailand 2013 2015 0.55 0.15 18.57 Illegal Access to Power 
Turkey 2005 2016 0.70 0.34 6.62 Legal Access/Minor Extension 
Ukraine 1997 2004 0.59 0.37 10.43 Legal Access/No Formal Extension 
Ukraine 2010 2012 0.63 0.47 9.11 Legal Access/No Formal Extension 
Venezuela 1999 2016 0.80 0.36 11.92 Legal Access/Major Extension 
Zambia 2014 2016 0.52 0.41 10.39 Legal Access/No Formal Extension  
Note: The Electoral Democracy Index (EDI) ranges from 0 (not democratic) to 1 (fully democratic). The 
autocratization rate captures the maximum EDI depletion during an autocratization episode as a percentage of its 
highest value (1). High values indicate a sudden autocratization episode and low values a gradual one.  
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Table A.1.2 Autocratization Episodes Starting in Autocracies  
 
Country Begin End EDI before EDI end 
FIRST WAVE     
Albania 1938 1940 0.21 0.05 
Argentina 1943 1944 0.31 0.10 
Bolivia 1932 1935 0.19 0.08 
Brazil 1930 1931 0.23 0.10 
Bulgaria 1934 1935 0.21 0.10 
Chile 1925 1926 0.30 0.18 
Costa Rica 1917 1918 0.34 0.21 
Cuba 1906 1907 0.32 0.20 
Cuba 1929 1934 0.31 0.19 
Dom. Rep. 1916 1917 0.28 0.13 
Dom. Rep. 1930 1931 0.29 0.13 
Ecuador 1936 1936 0.26 0.16 
Greece 1935 1937 0.39 0.05 
Honduras 1905 1906 0.19 0.09 
Hungary 1919 1919 0.26 0.13 
Hungary 1940 1945 0.35 0.18 
Italy 1921 1929 0.38 0.06 
Myanmar 1942 1943 0.24 0.11 
Philippines 1938 1943 0.27 0.08 
Portugal 1925 1927 0.26 0.05 
Romania 1938 1940 0.22 0.12 
Spain 1923 1924 0.24 0.07 
    
SECOND WAVE    
Afghanistan 1974 1978 0.19 0.09 
Algeria 1966 1966 0.20 0.09 
Argentina 1950 1956 0.42 0.16 
Bangladesh 1974 1976 0.45 0.14 
Country Begin End EDI before EDI end 
Bangladesh 1982 1983 0.43 0.20 
Benin 1965 1966 0.34 0.18 
Benin 1970 1973 0.28 0.10 
Bolivia 1958 1965 0.30 0.14 
Bolivia 1980 1981 0.25 0.11 
Brazil 1962 1965 0.44 0.15 
Burkina Faso 1966 1967 0.43 0.19 
Burundi 1965 1967 0.22 0.10 
Burundi 1988 1988 0.22 0.10 
CAR 1962 1966 0.27 0.09 
Cambodia 1970 1971 0.30 0.14 
Cambodia 1973 1980 0.24 0.08 
Chad 1972 1976 0.21 0.09 
China 1949 1950 0.20 0.08 
Colombia 1948 1950 0.28 0.16 
Comoros 1975 1975 0.26 0.13 
Congo 1962 1968 0.34 0.09 
Cuba 1952 1953 0.44 0.19 
Cuba 1959 1961 0.27 0.09 
Czech Republic 1950 1950 0.20 0.08 
DRC 1965 1970 0.31 0.09 
Dom. Rep. 1964 1964 0.44 0.17 
Ecuador 1963 1964 0.39 0.14 
Ecuador 1970 1973 0.38 0.15 
Egypt 1952 1954 0.27 0.06 
Equatorial Guinea 1969 1973 0.25 0.04 
Ghana 1961 1967 0.38 0.16 
Ghana 1972 1973 0.38 0.12 
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Greece 1966 1968 0.44 0.08 
Guatemala 1954 1956 0.40 0.10 
Guyana 1967 1981 0.47 0.26 
Honduras 1955 1955 0.28 0.15 
Honduras 1972 1973 0.30 0.15 
Hungary 1947 1950 0.28 0.13 
Indonesia 1957 1961 0.61 0.16 
Iraq 1958 1963 0.23 0.08 
Kuwait 1976 1977 0.28 0.09 
Kuwait 1986 1987 0.27 0.08 
Laos 1959 1965 0.33 0.18 
Laos 1975 1976 0.24 0.07 
Lesotho 1969 1969 0.37 0.19 
Liberia 1980 1981 0.24 0.10 
Libya 1969 1970 0.22 0.08 
Madagascar 1973 1973 0.26 0.15 
Malawi 1965 1965 0.29 0.09 
Malaysia 1964 1970 0.33 0.15 
Mali 1964 1969 0.26 0.11 
Mauritania 1979 1979 0.20 0.10 
Myanmar 1962 1963 0.46 0.08 
Nepal 1960 1961 0.26 0.11 
Niger 1974 1975 0.21 0.10 
Nigeria 1983 1984 0.41 0.20 
Pakistan 1978 1979 0.29 0.11 
Panama 1946 1947 0.32 0.18 
Panama 1964 1969 0.41 0.09 
Country Begin End EDI before EDI end 
Peru 1948 1949 0.33 0.10 
Peru 1968 1969 0.44 0.10 
Philippines 1969 1973 0.43 0.08 
Vietnam 1964 1965 0.32 0.16 
Rwanda 1973 1974 0.27 0.10 
Seychelles 1977 1978 0.35 0.10 
Sierra Leone 1967 1968 0.42 0.19 
Somalia 1969 1970 0.37 0.08 
South Korea 1961 1962 0.32 0.16 
South Korea 1972 1972 0.31 0.14 
Sudan 1958 1959 0.29 0.09 
Sudan 1969 1969 0.25 0.10 
Sudan 1989 1990 0.39 0.09 
Swaziland 1973 1974 0.21 0.10 
Syria 1949 1951 0.34 0.15 
Syria 1958 1959 0.33 0.09 
Syria 1963 1970 0.28 0.08 
Tanzania 1965 1967 0.33 0.22 
Thailand 1976 1977 0.29 0.12 
Togo 1961 1962 0.29 0.19 
Togo 1964 1968 0.27 0.09 
Turkey 1954 1960 0.45 0.24 
Uganda 1964 1972 0.42 0.09 
Uganda 1985 1986 0.25 0.13 
Venezuela 1949 1949 0.46 0.11 
Zambia 1968 1974 0.32 0.21 
Zanzibar 1964 1965 0.20 0.02 
     
THIRD WAVE 
Algeria 1992 1993 0.41 0.18 
Azerbaijan 1993 1995 0.40 0.26 
Bangladesh 2007 2007 0.54 0.23 
Bangladesh 2014 2016 0.50 0.37 
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Burundi 1994 1996 0.41 0.20 
Burundi 2006 2016 0.46 0.19 
CAR 2003 2004 0.35 0.21 
Comoros 1999 2000 0.49 0.23 
Congo 1993 1998 0.48 0.18 
Croatia 2016 2016 0.82 0.71 
Egypt 2013 2015 0.37 0.18 
Fiji 2000 2000 0.61 0.33 
Gambia 1993 1995 0.50 0.12 
Guinea-Bissau 2003 2003 0.47 0.28 
Guinea-Bissau 2012 2013 0.50 0.24 
Haiti 1992 1992 0.38 0.21 
Haiti 2000 2005 0.44 0.24 
Lesotho 1995 1995 0.62 0.31 
Lesotho 1999 1999 0.58 0.32 
Liberia 2004 2004 0.39 0.25 
Libya 2014 2014 0.53 0.29 
Macedonia 1999 1999 0.62 0.50 
Madagascar 2009 2010 0.50 0.23 
Nepal 1999 2003 0.42 0.22 
Pakistan 1999 2000 0.44 0.22 
Rwanda 1994 1995 0.31 0.11 
Country Begin End EDI before EDI end 
Sierra Leone 1998 1998 0.46 0.24 
Tajikistan 1992 1994 0.36 0.18 
Thailand 1991 1991 0.39 0.24 
Thailand 1993 1993 0.38 0.24 
Ukraine 2014 2015 0.50 0.35 
Yemen 2013 2016 0.40 0.13 
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Table A.2 Countries never Experiencing an Autocratization Episode 
 
DEMOCRACIES IN 2016 AUTOCRACIES IN 2016   
Country EDI 2016 Country EDI 2016   
Australia 0.88 Angola 0.32   
Barbados 0.71 Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.34   
Bhutan 0.54 Cameroon 0.36   
Botswana 0.68 Djibouti 0.28   
Canada 0.87 Eritrea 0.08   
Cape Verde 0.84 Ethiopia 0.25   
Cyprus 0.81 Gabon 0.43   
El Salvador 0.66 Guinea 0.44   
Georgia 0.76 Iran 0.23   
Iceland 0.84 Jordan 0.27   
Ireland 0.84 Kazakhstan 0.26   
Israel 0.73 Montenegro 0.46   
Ivory Coast 0.58 Morocco 0.31   
Jamaica 0.82 Mozambique 0.48   
Japan 0.78 North Korea 0.09   
Kenya 0.53 Oman 0.19   
Kosovo 0.51 Palestine/Gaza 0.14   
Kyrgyzstan 0.51 Papua New Guinea 0.49   
Lebanon 0.54 Qatar 0.09   
Mauritius 0.79 Saudi Arabia 0.02   
Mexico 0.67 Singapore 0.45   
Mongolia 0.68 Somaliland 0.47   
Namibia 0.75 South Sudan 0.18   
New Zealand 0.86 Turkmenistan 0.15   
Paraguay 0.62 Uzbekistan 0.20   
Senegal 0.72 Vietnam 0.25   
Slovakia 0.80 Zimbabwe 0.32   
Slovenia 0.86     
Solomon Islands 0.63     
South Africa 0.73     
Sweden 0.90     
Switzerland 0.88     
São Tomé and Príncipe 0.70     
Taiwan 0.80     
Timor-Leste 0.68     
Trinidad and Tobago 0.73     
Tunisia 0.75     
United Kingdom 0.87     
United States 0.85     
Vanuatu 0.68     
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APPENDIX B. Regional Breakdown of Autocratization Episodes 
 
Figure B.1 shows the proportion of countries affected by each wave by region. The first wave of 
autocratization diminished much - but not all - of the advances from the first wave of 
democratization in Europe, Central Asia and Latin America. In Asia-Pacific, Africa, and the 
MENA region there was not much of democratic progress to reverse at that point. The first wave 
of reversals also affected democratic and autocratic countries to almost the same degree. 
 
Figure B.1 Regional Distribution of Autocratization Episodes  
 
 
The 1960s’ and 70s’ second wave of autocratization mainly affected countries in Africa 
and Asia-Pacific that were electoral autocracies. The few democracies that were swept away during 
the second wave were mainly Latin American countries suffering from military coups, such as 
Argentina (1966, 1976) and Chile (1973), but also India in 1975. In India, Prime Minister Indria 
Gandhi’s autogolpe commenced a two-year interruption of the democratic regime due to extensive 
use of emergency powers including the suspension of elections. Western Europe and North 
America (apart from the military coup in Greece in 1967) as well as Eastern Europe and Central 
Asia were less affected by the second wave. Western countries remained democracies whereas the 
Eastern Europe and much of Central Asia remained subdued to the Soviet empire.   
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APPENDIX C: Regression analysis  
 
Data  
The unit of analysis is an autocratization episode as identified above. The dependent variable is 
the autocratization rate on a scale from 0 to 100% (see Part IV and Table A1.1). An autocratization 
rate of 10% corresponds to an EDI drop of 0.1 points at the peak of the episode. Gradual episodes 
have a low autocratization rate and sudden episodes a high one.  
 
The key independent variable is the global share of democracies – as a percentage of all countries 
- to capture the global spread of democracy. We control for the number of years since transition 
to democracy, because it seems likely that autocratization is faster in younger democracies. For 
instance, Svolik (2015) showed that as democracies grow older the risk of sudden military coups 
decreases whereas the risk of – potentially more protracted autogolpes remains the same. We also 
control for the level of the Electoral Democracy Index in the year before the peak of the episode, 
because if the prior level democracy is higher, there is a greater potential for the rate of 
autocratization to be high. In prior literature, economic development has been linked to 
autocratization (e.g. Przeworski et al. 2000). Therefore, we add control variables for GDP/per 
capita (log, t-1, Faris et al. based on Madison). Furthermore, we control for the time trend. We 
expect autocratization to be more gradual the longer an episode unfolds as sudden reversals 
typically occur at the beginning of an episode. Thus, we control for the duration of an episode. 
Similarly, instances of foreign occupation are likely to be associated with sudden breakdowns, 
which is why we include a dummy variable for whether a foreign power appoints the Head of the 
Executive based on V-Dem data (Coppedge et al. 2017a).   
 
Table C1. Summary statistics  
 
 N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Autocratization rate 62 19.65 12.41 3.30 46.60 
Global share of democracies (t-1) 62 36.92 18.75 6.67 56.32 
Electoral Democracy Index (V-Dem; t-1) 62 0.59 0.12 0.34 0.86 
Number of years since democratic transition 62 5.45 10.47 0.00 42.00 
GDP/capita (log, t-1) 61 8.01 0.80 6.13 9.88 
Time trend 62 1982.34 32.18 1914 2016 
Duration of episode 62 3.53 2.80 1.00 12.00 
Foreign occupation 62 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00 
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Results  
We estimate five linear regression models with the autocratization rate as dependent variable 
(Table A2.2). Model 1 focuses on the key independent variables. As expected, the autocratization 
rate decreases at a statistically significant level with an increasing global share of democracy. These 
findings hold when adding controls for potential alternative hypotheses in Models 3-5: level of 
Electoral Democracy (t-1), time trend, number of years since democratic transition, GDP/capita and duration of 
the episode. 
 
Table C2. Correlates of the Autocratization Rate  
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Global share of  -0.468*** -0.425*** -0.589** -0.578** 
democracies (t-1) (0.0604) (0.0561) (0.189) (0.195) 
     
Electoral Democracy   28.33** 29.98** 27.12* 
Index (V-Dem; t-1)  (9.988) (10.36) (12.73) 
     
Number of years since   -0.479*** -0.507*** -0.491*** 
democratic transition  (0.118) (0.121) (0.130) 
     
GDP/capita (log, t-1)   1.029 1.000 
   (1.348) (1.374) 
     
Time trend   0.103 0.105 
   (0.111) (0.113) 
     
Duration of episode    -0.114 
    (0.405) 
     
Foreign occupation    1.467 
    (4.496) 
     
Constant 36.94*** 21.35*** -186.8 -187.6 
 (2.497) (5.907) (215.7) (219.9) 
N 62 62 61 61 
adj. R2 0.492 0.595 0.595 0.581 
BIC 452.5 444.5 444.6 452.6 
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Robustness  
Main findings hold when the dependent variable – the pace of autocratization - is calculated using 
different metrics (Table A2.3): The average depletion per episode duration (Model 5); the annual 
depletion during all episode years (Model 6) as well as the decay rate22 (Model 7), which takes into 
account from which level the EDI decline started and for how many year the episode had lasted 
thus far. Whereas the results for the main independent variable (global share of democracy) are 
similar, the regression coefficient for the level of democracy in the prior year flips the sign in all 
three models (statistically significant in Model 6 and 7). For the annual depletion rate this might 
reflect that in countries with a higher EDI score, autocratization episodes are typically more 
protracted and thus more years with relatively small changes and high EDI scores are included in 
                                               
22 ( !"#$!"#%&'()&)+/-; where t is a year during an autocratization episode and n the number of years since the start of 
the episode.   
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the analysis. The decay rate corrects for the fact that higher declines are more likely the higher the 
baseline level is, which might explain the change in the sign. Further research on the relationship 
between prior levels of democracy and pace and likelihood of autocratization is needed.    
Furthermore, the main findings hold when autocratization episodes are specified differently 
(Appendix A4).  
 
Table C3. Correlates of Alternative Metrics Capturing the Pace of Autocratization  
  
 Model 5 
DV: Average 
Depletion 
Model 6 
DV: Annual Depletion 
Model 7 
DV: Decay Rate 
Global share of democracies  -0.480*** -0.526*** -0.00810*** 
(t-1) (0.136) (0.0814) (0.00103) 
    
Electoral Democracy Index  -5.187 -24.94*** -0.322*** 
(V-Dem; t-1) (6.695) (3.505) (0.0443) 
    
Number of years since  -0.168+ -0.195*** -0.00295*** 
democratic transition (0.0970) (0.0444) (0.000561) 
    
GDP/capita (log, t-1) 2.001* 1.589** 0.0347*** 
 (0.826) (0.508) (0.00642) 
    
Time trend 0.215** 0.205*** 0.00365*** 
 (0.0767) (0.0460) (0.000582) 
    
Duration of episode -0.999*** -0.420*** -0.0156*** 
 (0.178) (0.116) (0.00146) 
    
Foreign occupation 2.394 15.89*** 0.153*** 
 (2.539) (2.241) (0.0283) 
    
_cons -405.9** -371.5*** -6.830*** 
 (148.9) (89.04) (1.126) 
N 61 344 344 
adj. R2 0.637 0.548 0.568 
BIC 397.5 2377.8 -629.3 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
 
  
 38 
APPENDIX D: Additional figures 
Figure D1. The Development of Democracy in Turkey from 1900-2016 
 
 
Figure D2. Box Plot Autocratization Rate across the Waves of Autocratization (Democratic Recessions 
only) 
 
Note: The autocratization rate captures how fast the V-Dem Electoral Democracy Index declines from one year to the other at the 
peak of the autocratization episode. High values indicate sudden autocratization and low values more gradual. The first wave of 
autocratization includes episodes beginning between 1900 to 1945 (N=17); the second wave of autocratization from 1946 to 1990 
(N=12) and the third wave from 1991 to 2016 (N=39). 
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Figure D3. Average Autocratization Rate by Wave and Type of Access to and Extension of Chief 
Executive Power (Democratic Recessions only)  
 
Note: 17 episodes are included in the first wave; 12 in the second wave and 33 in the third wave. 
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APPENDIX E: Robustness Tests with Alternative Episode Specifications 
In the following, we test if the key findings of our paper are robust to alternative specifications of 
the autocratization episodes. In Appendix E.1 we report the findings for using a more conservative 
overall cut-off point for qualifying as autocratization episode – an overall decline of 0.12 on the 
EDI on the needs to be reached instead of 0.1 as in the main paper. E.2 reports the results allowing 
for four years of stagnation instead of three. E.3 we discuss the effects of using a higher threshold 
for the starting point of autocratization episodes (a decline of 0.02 instead of 0.01).  
 
E.1 Higher threshold to qualify as autocratization episode (overall EDI decline of more 
than 0.12) 
 
With 173 the number of autocratization episodes in this specification is lower than the 202 using 
the original specification (Table A.4.1.1). Figure A4.1.1 shows the three waves of autocratization 
as the original Figure 5 in a similar way – with the only exception that the peaks of the waves are 
less pronounced (e.g. only about 12% of countries affected at max in the second wave instead of 
almost 14% in the main specification). Also, the autocratization rate decreases in a similar way 
using this episode specification as the original one (A4.1.2). Overall, the correlation between time 
and the autocratization rate is with -0.69 slightly stronger as when using the original model 
specification. Similarly, the regression results reported in the main text hold with this model 
specification (Table A4.1.2).   
 
Table E1.1: Number of Autocratization Episodes by Wave and Type     
  
 Autocratic Before Democratic Before Total 
First Wave  15 16 31 
Second Wave 71 12 83 
Third Wave 30 29 59 
Total  116 57 173 
 
Figure E1.1: The Three Waves of Autocratization   
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Figure E1.2: Global Trend Autocratization Rate during Democratic Recessions and Share of 
Democracies 
 
Note: The autocratization rate captures how fast the V-Dem Electoral Democracy Index declines at the peak of the autocratization 
episode in terms of changes from one year to the other. High values indicate sudden autocratization and low values more gradual. 
The x-axis of the figure shows the year where the peak of the autocratization rate occurred during the episode.  
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Table E1.2: Correlates of the Autocratization Rate  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Global share of democracies (t-1) -0.482*** -0.438*** -0.577** -0.579** 
 (0.0612) (0.0585) (0.183) (0.189) 
     
Electoral Democracy Index   31.99** 34.37** 34.62* 
(V-Dem; t-1)  (10.16) (10.37) (13.04) 
     
Number of years since democratic   -0.407** -0.436*** -0.439** 
transition  (0.122) (0.124) (0.132) 
     
GDP/capita (log, t-1)   1.909 1.897 
   (1.433) (1.474) 
     
Time trend   0.0939 0.0920 
   (0.108) (0.110) 
     
Duration of episode    -0.0629 
    (0.402) 
     
Foreign occupation    -0.756 
    (4.440) 
     
_cons 38.13*** 20.03** -177.5 -173.5 
 (2.481) (6.070) (209.3) (214.1) 
N 57 57 56 56 
adj. R2 0.521 0.608 0.617 0.601 
BIC 412.2 406.7 405.3 413.3 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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E.2: Allowing for four instead of three years of stagnation during an autocratization 
episode 
 
With 199 the number of autocratization episodes in this specification is about the same as the 202 
using the original specification (Table A.4.2.1). Figure A4.2.1 shows the three waves of 
autocratization as the original Figure 5 in a similar way – with the minor exception that the peaks 
of the waves are more pronounced (e.g. more than 14% of countries affected at max in the second 
wave instead of almost 14% in the main specification). Also, the autocratization rate decreases in 
a similar way using this episode specification as the original one (A4.2.2). Overall, the correlation 
between time and the autocratization rate is with -0.67 about the same as when using the original 
model specification. Similarly, the regression results reported in the main text hold with this model 
specification (Table A4.2.2).   
 
Table E2.1: Number of Autocratization Episodes by Wave and Type     
  
 Autocratic Before Democratic Before Total 
First Wave  22 17 39 
Second Wave 84 11 95 
Third Wave 31 34 65 
Total  137 62 199 
 
 
Figure E2.1: The Three Waves of Autocratization   
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Figure E2.2: Global Trend Autocratization Rate during Democratic Recessions and Share of 
Democracies 
 
Note: The autocratization rate captures how fast the V-Dem Electoral Democracy Index declines at the peak of the autocratization 
episode in terms of changes from one year to the other. High values indicate sudden autocratization and low values more gradual. 
The x-axis of the figure shows the year where the peak of the autocratization rate occurred during the episode.  
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Table E2.2: Correlates of the Autocratization Rate  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Global share of  -0.466*** -0.425*** -0.532* -0.629** 
democracies (t-1) (0.0600) (0.0588) (0.201) (0.203) 
     
Electoral Democracy   27.30* 29.03* 21.77+ 
Index (V-Dem; t-1)  (10.55) (10.99) (12.96) 
     
Number of years since   -0.420** -0.434** -0.406** 
democratic transition  (0.132) (0.137) (0.141) 
     
GDP/capita (log, t-1)   0.441 0.139 
   (1.444) (1.408) 
     
Time trend   0.0650 0.133 
   (0.117) (0.117) 
     
Duration of episode    -0.357 
    (0.409) 
     
Foreign occupation    1.998 
    (4.546) 
     
_cons 37.15*** 21.78*** -107.6 -231.5 
 (2.516) (6.290) (226.4) (225.6) 
N 64 64 63 61 
adj. R2 0.484 0.551 0.542 0.563 
BIC 467.6 465.0 466.1 454.1 
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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E.3: Lower starting threshold for episodes - a decline of 0.02 instead of 0.01 on the EDI 
 
With 195 the number of autocratization episodes in this specification is slightly lower than the 202 
using the original specification (Table A.4.3.1). In particular, only 55 instead of 62 cases of 
democratic recession are identified with this specification – which makes sense as a higher starting 
threshold is likely to exclude some of the more gradual episodes typical for democratic contexts. 
Nevertheless, Figure A4.3.1 shows the three waves of autocratization in a similar way as the 
original Figure 5– with the exception that the peaks of the waves are less pronounced (e.g. less 
than 12% of countries affected at max in the second wave instead of almost 14% in the main 
specification). Also, the autocratization rate decreases in a similar way using this episode 
specification as the original one (A4.3.2). Overall, the correlation between time and the 
autocratization rate is with -0.67 about the same as when using the original model specification. 
Similarly, the regression results reported in the main text hold with this model specification (Table 
A4.3.2).   
 
Table E3.1: Number of Autocratization Episodes by Wave and Type     
  
 Autocratic Before Democratic Before Total 
First Wave  20 17 37 
Second Wave 82 11 93 
Third Wave 38 27 65 
Total  140 55 195 
 
 
Figure E3.1: The Three Waves of Autocratization   
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Figure E3.2: Global Trend Autocratization Rate during Democratic Recessions and Share of 
Democracies 
 
Note: The autocratization rate captures how fast the V-Dem Electoral Democracy Index declines at the peak of the autocratization 
episode in terms of changes from one year to the other. High values indicate sudden autocratization and low values more gradual. 
The x-axis of the figure shows the year where the peak of the autocratization rate occurred during the episode.  
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Table E3.2: Correlates of the Autocratization Rate  
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Global share of  -0.486*** -0.436*** -0.705*** -0.703*** 
democracies (t-1) (0.0645) (0.0588) (0.191) (0.198) 
     
Electoral Democracy   30.91** 33.58** 33.11* 
Index (V-Dem; t-1)  (10.31) (10.51) (13.32) 
     
Number of years since   -0.493*** -0.531*** -0.531*** 
democratic transition  (0.121) (0.123) (0.131) 
     
GDP/capita (log, t-1)   1.359 1.348 
   (1.431) (1.468) 
     
Time trend   0.169 0.168 
   (0.112) (0.115) 
     
Duration of episode    -0.0452 
    (0.409) 
     
Foreign occupation    -0.0242 
    (4.470) 
     
_cons 37.50*** 20.41** -316.1 -314.7 
 (2.561) (6.114) (217.6) (222.7) 
N 55 55 54 54 
adj. R2 0.508 0.623 0.635 0.619 
BIC 403.0 394.2 392.1 400.0 
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
 
 
